Multi-Receiver GPS Spoofing Detection for PMU Timing Verification using a Hybrid Communication Network

3 pm Tuesday, Feb. 5

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Overview

In the future Smart Grid, Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) will monitor the power grid state in real-time by synchronizing measurements across the network using GPS. However, because civilian GPS is unencrypted, PMUs are susceptible to spoofing. We propose a spoofing detection algorithm using a wide-area, hybrid communication architecture: Each PMU securely transmits conditioned signal fragments containing the military P(Y) signal, which serves as an encrypted signature in the background of all authentic GPS signals. This signature is then verified amongst several, distant receivers, strategically picked with our subset selection algorithm. We further defend against coordinated attacks on regional receiver collections by comparing representative signals generated for each sub-network. To estimate system latencies, we develop a tool that simulates queuing processes for a given network realization. Using real-world data recorded during a government-sponsored, live-sky spoofing event, we demonstrate our algorithm successfully evaluates the authenticity of a widely dispersed receiver network.

Presenters

Tara Yasmin Mina is a graduate student in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She received her B.S. with honors in Electrical Engineering from Iowa State University in 2017.

 

 

Sriramya Bhamidipati is a doctoral student in the Aerospace Engineering Department at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. She received her M.S. degree in Aerospace Engineering from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2017. She received her B.Tech. with honors in Aerospace Engineering and minor in Systems and Controls Engineering from Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India, in 2015.